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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to revisit the question if trade promotes
peace or not? I account for heterogeneity of trade dyads over time in
using panel estimation techniques. The world is modeled as a rectangle.
I present models focusing on how conflict affects trade, and in another
set of models how trade affects conflict. To account for simultaneity I
use past values of trade and conflict, as well an instrumental variable ap-
proach. My instruments to explain conflict are military expenditures and
a military capability index. The instrumental variable to explain trade is
annual rainfall. I find in most setups that trade and interstate conflict
are reciprocal. Trade indeed promotes peace because of welfare gained
from international trade. Past values of conflict or trade have a negative
impact in their respective models. Only after accounting for endogeneity
in using an instrumental variable approach, the negative relationship be-
comes insignificant or positive in some setups. I employ a dynamic panel
estimator to deal with possible limitations of the instrumental variables.
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1 Introduction
The question if trade promotes peace, in reducing the probability of interstate
conflict, has been in the focus of empirical research for the last 30 years. Up to
today the answer is not conclusive, although a tendency exists that trade indeed
reduces conflict (Barbierie 1996, 2001, Russet and Oneal 1999, 2001, Polachek
1980, 2004). A few researchers asked if conflict reduces trade and some evidence
exists it does (Long 2008, Martin et Al 2008). Clearly the causality goes both
ways and focusing on one direction only results in biased estimates by ignoring
endogeneity.
Furthermore the approaches are diverse, which makes it difficult to compare
results. Diversity is not just introduced by covering different countries or years
or in using different regression techniques, but also by the use of regressors. For
instance if a trade relationship involves two countries how does one include a
variable like Polity, a measure of democracy? Is it the sum of the Polity scores
of two countries, the product, the lower score or the simple average?
I suggest an empirical model widely accepted in economics to solve for this
problem: the gravity equation. In a gravity equation variables describing coun-
try i and j enter the model for country i and j respectively. The gravity equation
is flexible enough to model any dyadic relationship. I will use it not only for
the question if trade promotes peace but also if conflict reduces trade or not.
I follow Pollins (1989) who introduced the gravity model in this area as well
Keshk, Pollins and Reveuny (2004) who show both directions in their work.
Most of the research done assumes that dyadic trade relationships do not
change over time in using pooled regressions. Pooling data also introduces an
omitted variable bias by not including fixed effects, which are common to all
country pairs. Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) introduce fixed effect panel
estimations in their paper but only apply it to the question if trade promotes
peace or in their words: ”Make trade not war”. They recognize that the causal-
ity goes from conflict to trade as well but do not apply a panel model. I will fill
this gap.
Martin, Mayer and Thoenig deal with endogeneity by including lags of con-
flict in their trade model, and preferential trade agreements (PTA) as an in-
strumental variable for bilateral trade in their conflict model. My goal is to
use IV-regressions in the trade model and to chose a different instrument in the
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conflict model. I argue that PTAs work to a disadvantage for some countries,
which could increase conflict potential. Furthermore those agreements cover
only goods of lower quality and not all trade by countries.
A more serious concern is the structure of the world. It is common to follow
Barbieri’s (1996) structure which is a world in a descending order. Every trade
relationship enters the model once e.g. if the US trades with Canada it enters
the model, but if Canada trades with the US it does not. This does not impose a
problem necessarily, but the world has to start somewhere. It starts with the US
and follows the Correlates of War country codes. The ordering in this structure
includes more developed countries than developing or underdeveloped countries,
which could bias results towards developed countries. I model the world as a
rectangle common in the trade literature in economics, which includes the trade
relationship US and Canada and Canada and US separately 1. Trade in one
direction is not necessarily the same when it goes in the other direction. My
approach covers almost all countries of the world and the period 1948 to 2001.
I find in many specifications that conflict indeed reduces trade and that trade
indeed reduces conflict. After introducing past values of conflict in the trade
model, conflict has a long-lasting negative impact on current trade. Using past
values of conflict in the trade model shows that only last period’s trade level
effects the probability of a conflict negatively. Once accounting for endogeneity
in using current values I find that the relationship between trade and conflict
tends to disappear. Conflict has a small positive impact on trade. Given that
trade contracts are set in advance and arms trade is a part of overall trade, it is
not surprising, that current conflict levels do not reduces current trade levels.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will discuss the relevant litera-
ture briefly as well present some arguments why trade and conflict affect each
other. Section 3 describes the data and the models. Section 4 focuses on the
effects of conflict on trade. Section 5 focuses on the effects of trade on conflict.
Section 6 covers the robustness checks, while the paper concludes in section 7.
1Long (2008) uses a rectangular world but limits his analysis to a few countries and years
only.
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2 The Conflict Trade Nexus
A conflict between two countries, usually defined as a militarized interstate
dispute (MID), can interrupt trade flows. MIDs can include threats, the display
of force and battles having less than 1000 deaths but are short of war (Jones,
Bremer and Singer 1996, p.163) . Furthermore countries having a history of
dispute are less likely to trade for example Israel and its neighboring countries
do not trade with each other at all. If we assume that free trade is beneficial
for participating countries a conflict can reduce the gains of trade. Conflict
therefore has opportunity cost in trade benefits forgone. Governments have
to compare the marginal benefits of starting a conflict with possible marginal
benefits from doing so (Polachek 1980,2004). Polachek (1980) presents this idea
as a welfare maximization model.
Another explanation why trade can reduce the probability of conflict is that
countries who trade with each other have to communicate. Trade therefore
enhances cooperation. This understanding of the world, going back to Kant,
is known as the liberal peace hypothesis (Barbieri 1996). Pollins (1989) and
Keshk and Pollins (2004) use a gravity equation to test the liberal hypothesis
and find that trade indeed reduces conflict.
Barbieri (1996,2001) contests this idea and argues that trade dependency
increases conflict potentials. The reason is that some countries profit more from
trade than others. Gains are asymmetrically distributed and create tensions
between countries. Barbierie as well Russet and Oneal (1999,2001) find in their
work that trade indeed increases conflict potentials. Trade gains could be used
for national defense. Countries feel threatened by increased spending on national
defense and tensions may arise; trade creates ”security externalities” (Gowa
1994).
Trade does not necessarily have to stop if there is a conflict between two
countries. Barbieri and Schneider (1999) find that if a conflict is short (less than
a year) trade levels do not necessarily decrease significantly. One explanation is
offered by Morrow (1999).
Morrow focuses on the role of firms. Firms are trading and not countries
which only build the framework firms operate in. Morrow explains how past
levels of conflict affect current trade. A profit maximizing firm has to form ex-
pectations about the future because trade between firms across different coun-
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tries is based on contracts set in advance. A conflict increases transaction cost
e.g. by creating trade barriers, shipments could be delayed at customs or never
make it to the other firm. Furthermore a conflict changes export and import
prices which a firm has to account for. Firms form rational expectations in
using past outcomes of conflict. By the time a conflict occurs it has no effect on
current trade. Only past levels of conflict have a negative impact on trade. Li
and Sacko (2002) test Morrow’s hypothesis and find, in using one lag of conflict
in a gravity-style specification, that conflict affects the change in trade levels
negatively.
The results mentioned above could be biased because of the pooling of data.
Green, Kim and Yoon (2001) apply a fixed effect logit model and find no re-
lationship between trade and conflict. A fixed effect logit model explains why
changes occur and cannot one to one be compared with an underlying pooled
regression. Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) apply a linear probability fixed
effect model to explain how trade affects conflict. They find that trade reduces
conflict in some specifications. Furthermore they apply a pooled model to the
question how conflict affects trade. Past conflict outcomes have a long lasting
and negative impact on current trade levels.
3 Empirical strategy and data
I use the gravity equation for my empirical models. The gravity equation is
based on the potential concept from physics. The idea is that two objects
attract each other because of their size and their distance. The idea goes back
to Isard (1954) and was empirically applied in Tinbergen (1962) for the first
time. The gravity equation takes the following basic form (Tinbergen, p.264):
Tij = β0Y
β1
i Y
β2
j D
β3
ij (1)
where Yi and Yj is the mass of an object or GDP and Dij the actual distance
between two objects or two countries. After taking the log, letting Tij be the
trade between two countries and adding a vector of country attributes (at), the
gravity equation over time t is as follows:
ln(tradeijt)=β0 + β1 ln(GDPit) + β2 ln(GDPjt) + β3 distanceij
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The gravity model assumes that there is attraction between the GDP of two
countries i and j, the same for attributes i and j. Attraction can be interpreted
as dependence between two variables. The practical implication is that there is
no need to construct summary variables containing the information for country
i and j.
I model the world as a rectangle or ”square”. My rectangular world is based
on the dataset available on the CEPII project website provided by Head, Mayer
and Ries (2010). The dataset includes relevant gravity variables like GDP, per
capita income, distance, official language, regional trade agreements and other
variable describing similarities between countries. I add IMF trade data for the
period 1948 to 2001 from the historical and current Direction of Trade Statistic.
The conflict variables is a binary variable which equals one if an MID occurred
between two countries in a given year and zero otherwise. I use MID because
there have been only a few wars in the last 60 years. Information on MID
is from the Correlates of War Project (2010) and their MID dataset (V3.1), as
well from Maoz (2005) and his dyadic MID dataset (V2). The Correlates of War
project also offers information on formal alliances, military capabilities proxied
by military expenditures (Milex) and by a military capability index (CINC).
The democracy measurement is the Unified Democracy Score (UDS) provided
by Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010). Although Polity is a standard variable
I use UDS for following reasons. The UDS is continuous and offers around
80.000 more observations than Polity. Both measurements for democracy behave
similarly.
Overall I observe 50176 country pairs (or trade dyads) from 1948 to 2001.
The dataset contains 2659381 observations and covers 224 countries of the world.
Due to missing values in trade data and other relevant variables I can only make
use of 640.000 observations in my typical regressions.
I deal with missing values in treating them as real missing values but assume
them to be zero as a robustness check later. Another issue with trade data is
how to deal with taking the log of zero. I use total trade in millions of dollars
and add one dollar to each observation. Trade, GDP, per capita income and
military expenditures are measured in 2005 constant USD.
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I want to know, if the pooling of data is crucial to the results or not. Pool-
ing data in context where dyads are observed over time introduces an omitted
variable bias, but also assumes that dyads do not change over time. For that
reason I compare pooled models with fixed effect panel models. To be at the
same page with the political science literature, I show results for population-
average based GEE models. Although those models use the panel structure
in the data, they are not panel models. Furthermore the coefficients have a
different interpretation.
I approach the conflict trade relationship from two angles. First I want to
know how conflict affects trade. In a second step I want to know how trade
affects conflict. Causality clearly goes both ways. I will deal with endogeneity
caused by simultaneity in using past values of the endogenous variables (trade or
conflict respectively) and an instrumental variable approach for current values
of trade or conflict.
The empirical part of the paper concludes with a series of robustness checks
where I will only present the coefficients on trade or conflict respectively.
4 Does conflict affect trade?
Conflict can affect trade through two channels. First, governments can increase
trade barriers if tensions arise. Tariffs can be imposed on imports, certain goods
can be banned from importing or exporting to a country or countries do not
trade with each other at all. In this light current or past conflict can have a
negative impact on current trade. Second, another channel is the firm’s view.
Even if trade is officially possible, a conflict increases transaction cost for firms.
A simple tariff on firms exports to another country increase the price of a good.
Trade deliveries could be held at custom or if small skirmishes are already taking
place, the risk of loosing a shipment could increase. To compensate for the risk
firms will increase their prices (Morrow 1999).
Table 1 shows the results for the baseline model. I present results for a
pooled regression (column 2), for a fixed effect panel estimator (column 3) and
for a population average GEE estimator (column 4).
I use a gravity equation to model the effects of conflict defined as a milita-
rized instate dispute (Conflictij) on current trade levels. Trade is measured as
the sum of export and imports between two countries. The gravity equation
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includes controls for size (GDP), wealth (PCI) and distance. Distance is mea-
sured as the actual distance between two capitals (distij) and sharing a border
or not (contigij). Trade between two countries is more likely if linkages or simi-
larities exist (Head, Mayer and Ries 2010). Linkages can be proxied by sharing
an official language (languageij), regional trade agreements (RTAij), a common
currency (Currencyij), by former colonial relationships (Colonij) and a com-
mon legal system (Legalij). Democracies are more open to trade compared to
autocratic systems (Barbieri 1996). I use the Unified Democracy Score (UDS)
to proxy for the political system. To account for effects common to every trade
dyad, I include a time trend, time fixed effects and a variable indicating the
Cold War period (Coldwar).
Conflict reduces trade in the pooled model. GDP has a positive effect on
trade, as well per capita income (PCI). PCI could have a negative impact, be-
cause wealthier countries diverse away from trade towards domestic consump-
tion. Distance, measured as actual distance and contiguity, has the expected
signs. Countries further away trade less, because transportation cost increase,
while neighboring countries trade more. Variables measuring ties e.g. a com-
mon currency, a colonial background and the same legal system increase trade
flows. Regional trade agreements are ambiguous in the literature, ranging from
a positive, a negative or no effect on trade (World Bank 2005). RTA has a
negative impact on trade and shows trade diversion. RTA remains negative
and significant in all my regressions. The Cold War had no significant effect
on trade, especially given that trade flows have been increasing since the end of
WW II. Finally states more democratic than others do trade more. The positive
effect of democracy on trade remains a robust and highly significant finding in
most of the setups.
Column 3 shows the results for the fixed effect panel regression. An F-test
indicates that fixed effects are present. Conflict remains negative and highly
significant after accounting for changes in trade dyads over time. GDP and
per capita have the same signs and significance as in the pooled regression.
Time invariant variables like distance drop out. I performed, but do not report
results2, for random effects panel models to judge the influence of time invariant
variables. They are similar in sign and significance as in the underlying pooled
regression. Random effects are present in the pooled model, but a standard
2Results can be obtained from the author upon request.
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Hausmann test favors the fixed effect regression over the random effects one.
The last column of table 1 shows the results for the GEE estimator. A GEE
estimator does not follow a particular dyad over time but a typical or average
dyad. I present results because the estimator is standard in political science
to answer the question if trade reduces conflict. The AR(1) link does not deal
with autocorrelation in error terms but assumes instead that the within group
variation from one year to another is linked to the year before. The majority of
the regressors remain similar in sign and significance but the variable of main
interest conflict becomes insignificant. Current conflict has no effect on current
trade in a population average model.
In using current conflict levels to explain current trade I introduce an endo-
geneity bias because causality goes in both directions. Including past values is
one possibility to overcome this problem. I also include leads or future outcomes
of conflict to explain trade. This allows me to test Morrow’s hypothesis of ra-
tional expectations which assumes that firms consider past outcomes of conflict
before they decide to trade. Including leads completes the rational expectation
model and was not done in this particular context before. I include ten leads
and ten lags of conflict in my regressions. Table 2 summarizes the results. I
report only results for five leads and lags to conserve space.
Most of the variables remain similar in sign and significance. Per capita
income (PCI) changes the sign but remains significant in the fixed effect model.
Including lags of conflict reveals that previous level of hostility have a long-
lasting and negative effect on current trade. The history between two countries
matters, such that tensions remain significant between two countries over time.
In other words why should I trade with my enemy? Including leads of conflict
shows in the pooled and fixed effect panel model, that the next period matters.
If a firm expects a conflict next year, it will trade less today. The forward
looking behavior can be explained by the profit maximization of firms where
trade contracts are set in advance.
I deal with endogeneity, caused by using current values of conflict to explain
current trade, in table 3. I suggest four instrumental variable (IV) models. In
column 1 of table 3 I use a 2-SLS regression based on OLS. A similar approach
is to use a logit regression in the first stage to explain conflict to get a predicted
value for conflict probability. I use this value as an regressor in the second stage
to explain trade. In column 3 I show the results for the fixed effect panel IV-
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model. I have two instruments available which explain conflict but likely not
trade. I use military expenditures (Milex) and a national military capability
index (CINC) both are available for most countries and come from the National
Materials Capability dataset offered by the Correlates of War project (2010).
It could be argued that parts of those instruments are linked with trade e.g.
countries buy weapons which is part of trade. I will utilize a dynamic panel
estimator suggested by Aranello and Bond (1991) which uses past values of the
endogenous variable as its own instruments (GMM-Bond). It has the advantage
that it corrects for autocorrelation and makes the choice of instruments easier.
One drawback is that the GMM estimator looses some of its reliability in large
T studies.
Table 3 shows results for the first stage regressions where available and the
second stage. I find that CINC does not explain conflict, although it is com-
monly used in the literature (Russet and Oneal 1999, Barbieri 2001). Instead
military expenditures have a positive effect on conflict outcomes. The more
a country spends on national defense, the more likely it is to show its power.
Tests for exogeneity of the instruments in the IV-models (Hansen and Sargent),
as well the GMM-Bond model, show that the first stage instruments are valid.
The sign and significance of the regressors remains meaningful. Finally the first
stage F-statistics are promising, where available. I will discuss the results for
the first stage regressor, when I focus on the adverse effects of trade on conflict.
My main finding is that current conflict has a positive effect on current trade,
but only remains significant in the OLS-IV and GMM-Bond model. Does it
mean that conflict actually increases trade flows? It depends, but given that
trade contracts have to be fulfilled, the occurrence of a conflict today does not
affect current trade flows negatively. Another explanation could be that weapons
are for many countries an important part of trade, for instance Germany set
another record in 2011 in exporting military equipment and weapons 3. Given
that many countries export and import military equipment, a positive effect is
not unlikely at all. Furthermore after the end of the Cold War, not only the
number of civil wars increased (Upsalla Database 2011), but also the number of
MIDs. Barbieri and Schneider (1999) find that trade even takes place between
enemies if the conflict or war is short.
3Germany’s military industry had another boom year in 2010, see: http://www.n-tv.de/
politik/Ruestungsindustrie-boomt-article4949776.html, accessed 12/08/2011
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5 Does trade affect conflict?
Trade can affect conflict negatively, positively or not at all. According to Po-
lacheks (1980) welfare maximization model governments realize that gains of
trade will be reduced by international conflict. The liberal peace hypothesis
(Barbierie 1996) states that trade forces countries to communicate with each
other. Communication leads to cooperation and finally peace. Trade therefore
reduces international conflict. In the realist view of the world (Barbieri 1996)
trade creates dependencies. When trade benefits are distributed assymetrically
between two countries tensions may arise. Gowa (1994) shows that trade can
create security externalities because gains of trade can be used for national de-
fense. Trade has a positive effect on conflict. Finally Morrow (1999) argues
that current trade has no effect on conflict because firms trade. Firms use in-
formation on past conflict outcomes to decide to trade with another country or
not.
I employ a gravity equation including GDP, per capita income (PCI) and two
measurements of distance (Distij and Contigij). Distance can be ambiginous
in explaining conflict. Conflicts can be between neighboring countries for in-
stance over territory e.g. India and Pakistan but also between countries farther
away from each other. Especially after the end of the Cold War, UN and Nato
missions were conducted in countries like Somalia, the former Yugoslavia or the
Iraq. Conflicts in the past were between colonies and colonizers e.g. between
former African colonies and their European motherlands in the 1960’s. I use
official language spoken and colonial ties to account for historical ties. The legal
background matters, because countries which have a similar system fight less
(Martin, Mayer and Thoenig 2008). Democracies are known to be more peace-
ful, which is known as the democratic peace hypothesis. I include the Unified
Democracy Score (UDS) to measure the level of democracy, because UDS offers
more observations than the standard Polity IV variable. Military expenditures
have an effect on international conflict. Countries which spend more on their
military are more likely to display and use force. I include a variable indicating
if two countries are in a formal military alliance defined as a defense treaty4.
To account for time effects common to every trade dyad, I include a variable
indicating the Cold War period, time fixed effects and a year trend.5
4Declared as a type 1 alliance according to the COW definition.
5Note that, some of the models do not converge if including a year trend and / or time
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Because of the binary nature of the conflict variable MID, I use non-linear
estimation methods.6 Table 4 summarizes the results for the pooled logit (col-
umn 1), the fixed effect logit model (column 2) and a population average GEE
logit estimator (column 3).7 The GEE estimator is standard in political science
for this particular question.
In the pooled logit model (Table 4) current trade has a negative and highly
significant impact on current conflict, which is in favor of the liberal peace hy-
pothesis. GDP does not explain conflict outcomes. In a model without military
expenditure GDP has a positive effect on conflict.8 After including military ex-
penditures, GDP becomes insignificant. Military expenditures are part of GDP
and explain the variation in conflict outcomes significantly. Countries spend-
ing more on national defense are more likely do display and use their military
power. Wealthier countries, in terms of higher per capita income (PCI), are less
involved in international conflict. Distance measured as actual distance between
two capitals has a negative impact on conflict, while neighboring countries are
more likely to be involved in a conflict. Sharing a common official language
and having a history as a colony and colonizer increases the potential for con-
flict between two countries. Many countries having an interstate conflict also
share a common language for example China and Taiwan or Korea and South
Korea. The legal background has no significant impact on conflict, similarly
for alliances. Finally democracy, measured by the Unified Democracy Score,
has a strong negative impact on conflict, as predicted by the democratic peace
hypothesis.
The fixed effect logit model is different from the underlying pooled logit
model. Changes in conflict outcomes are explained. If a dyad was in conflict at
time t but not at t− 1 it enters the model. If a dyad has the same outcome in
two consecutive periods it does not enter the model. Time invariant variables
drop out, because they do not contain new information.
Column 2 of table 4 shows the results for the fixed effect logit model. Trade
has a highly significant and negative impact on changes in conflict levels. GDP
fixed effects.
6I used linear probability models for pooled version but do not report results here. The
LPM and pooled logit results do not differ substantially. Results can be requested from the
author.
7I do not show results for a random effects logit estimator, but the results are similar in
sign and significance compared to the underlying pooled logit estimator.
8I do not report the results here.
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has a negative effect. Countries larger in economic size fight less. Per capita
income (PCI) has no explanatory power. Policy variables like democracy and
military expenditures have a similar impact as in the pooled logit model. Al-
liance is significant in the fixed effect model and reduces conflict.
The population average logit model is similar in sign and significance as the
pooled logit model. Slightly different results are caused by the AR(1) link, while
the GEE model without an assumed link within groups would converge to the
pooled logit model. Trade has a negative impact on conflict.
In using current trade to explain current conflict levels I introduce a simul-
taneity bias in my models. I include 10 lags of trade and present the results
table 5. Furthermore I can answer the question if the trade history between
countries matters in reducing interstate conflict or not. I report only five lags
of trade to conserve space.
Only previous period’s trade levels explain current conflict in the same em-
pirical models as above (table 5). Governments act short-sighted when an in-
terstate conflict occurs and do not account for past trade relationships. Head et
Al find (2010) that former colonies, after breaking off from their motherlands,
start trading again with each other a few years later. Given that movements
for independence initiated decolonization, the conflict is forgotten a few years
later. Other control variables remain similar in sign and significance in all three
models.
Another strategy to deal with endogeneity, caused by using current trade
levels to explain current conflict, is to use an instrumental variable approach.
The instrument to explain bilateral trade is rainfall. Rainfall matters for many
countries in affecting economic outcomes for instance GDP growth (Miguel,
Satyanath and Sergenti Ernest 2004). Trade is linked to GDP. I use annual
rainfall data from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research . Rainfall
data are available from 1961 to 2000, which limits the sample. I employ an
IV Probit model. To account for the panel nature I use an fixed effect IV
linear probability panel model (IV FE LPM). It could be argued that rainfall
is not the best instrument available. To account for possible limitations I use a
dynamic panel GMM estimator, where past trade levels are instruments for the
endogenous variable trade (GMM-Bond).
Table 6 summarizes the first and second stage results. In the first stage
the endogenous variable trade is explained by the same variables as conflict but
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rainfall is added as an instrument. First stage results are valid in sign and
significance of the regressors, as well the F-test values. Tests for exogeneity of
the instruments (Hansen and Sargent) indicate that rainfall is indeed exogenous.
Column 1 presents the results for the IV-probit model. Standard gravity
variables like GDP, per capita income (PCI) and distance have the expected
signs and are highly significant. Alliances have a negative effect on trade and
behave as regional trade agreement in the trade conflict models.9 Military ex-
penditures have a positive effect on trade. Many countries import the military
equipment they need. Rainfall has a strong positive impact on current trade. In
the second stage trade has a positive effect on conflict, which could be explained
by increased tensions through trade dependencies. Most variables are similar
in sign and significance as before. The negative impact of GDP is more signif-
icant. Military expenditures and democracy have the same impact on conflict.
The actual distance between two countries has a positive impact. While many
conflicts during the Cold War were between neighboring countries, after 1992
conflicts were between countries further away, for instance the involvement of
NATO allies in Iraq or in the former Yugoslavia.
The fixed effect panel model (column 2) performs similar to the IV-probit
model in the first stage.10 After accounting for endogeneity and changes over
time, the second stage shows different results. Current trade has no significant
effect on conflict. Standard gravity variables loose their significance, while policy
variables like military expenditures and democracies remain significant.
The GMM Bond model (column 3) differs, because past values of the en-
dogenous variables are used as instruments. Trade has a negative impact on
conflict. Variables like GDP, PCI and distance measures remain significant and
similar in their signs. The democracy variables do not explain conflict outcomes
but military expenditures do. Military expenditures have a strong and positive
effect on conflict. Tests for exogeneity show that the instruments are valid.
9Mansfield and Gowa (1997) show that regional trade agreements and alliance have the
same effect on trade. It could be argued that regional trade agreements follow alliances.
10Actually both first stage regressions are based on OLS.
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6 Robustness checks
I perform three robustness checks. First I want to know how the level of devel-
opment of a country affects the relationship between trade and conflict in my
models. Second researchers argue that the democratic peace hypothesis is an
artifact of the Cold War (Barbieri 1996). I limit the sample to the post Cold
War period. Third I deal differently with missing values in assuming them to be
zero. The results are summarized in table 7. To conserve space, I only report
coefficients on the conflict and trade variable respectively. The first part of ta-
ble 7 shows the results for the trade models. The second part of table 7 shows
the results for the conflict models.11 I limit my analysis to current variables,
because past outcomes did not change in the new setups.
The level of development is a known predictor for trade but also for con-
flict. More developed countries are likely to trade more and are less involved in
conflicts compared to less developed countries. I use the Human Development
Index (HDI) to proxy for development. The HDI is available from 1970 onwards
and covers most countries. Other possible development indicators e.g. school
enrollment, available in the World Development Indicator database, cover the
same years. Nonetheless the HDI summarize most indicators available sepa-
rately into one index. Countries in the sample are developed on the average
(HDI=0.61). HDI has a positive and significant effect on trade in my models,
and a negative or no effect on conflict.12 The effect of current conflict on current
trade is mixed. Conflict looses some of the previous significance. Adding HDI
to the conflict models shows that trade has no effect on conflict.
The post Cold War period covers the years 1992 to 2001. For the post
Cold War period the results are mixed for both models. Conflict has a negative
impact on trade in the pooled model but looses significance in the fixed effect
panel model. I find a positive effect of conflict on trade in the instrumental
variable models. The effect of trade on conflict is not significant or slightly
negative for the post Cold War period. Trade has a positive effect on conflict
only in the IV probit model.
The IMF trade statistic includes many missing values for trade relationships
which are unlikely to have any significant amount of trade. Although it is re-
ported as missing or not available, trade is likely to be zero. Why should Tuvalu
11Results for other control variables can be requested from the author.
12Results are not reported but available upon request.
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trade with the Oman? Israel does not trade with its neighboring countries for
obvious political reasons, but trade is not coded as zero. I treat missing values
as zero, which increases the sample by more than 200.000 observations. The ef-
fect of conflict on trade is negative and significant, even in models which showed
a different result before. Conflict reduces trade. I find similar results in the con-
flict models. Trade reduces conflict in most setups, while I found mixed results
before. The reciprocal relationship between trade and conflict persists but the
question is, can we trust these results? Although it is common to declare miss-
ing values in trade as zero, Head et Al (2010) argue that this can bias results,
because we do not know for sure if missing trade observations are really zero or
not.
7 Conclusion
The discussion if trade and interstate conflict are related has left a mixed picture
in the literature. Trade and conflict can be negatively, positively or not related
at all. The causality goes both ways. Trade can affect conflict (the liberal
peace hypothesis), or conflict can affect trade (Morrows rational expectation
hypothesis).
My research design adds to the discussion by changing the structure of the
world to a rectangle, accounting for endogeneity and the panel structure in both
setups. The underlying empirical model is a gravity equation. I cover the period
1948 to 2001, as well almost all countries of the world.
The main results show, that trade and conflict are negatively related in dif-
ferent setups. Past values of conflict have a long-lasting and negative effect
on current trade levels. To account for possible forward looking behavior of
firms, I include leads of conflict. Firms plan only one period ahead. Similarly
only last period’s trade levels have a negative impact on current conflict levels.
After accounting for endogeneity in using current trade or current conflict in
their respective models, I find a tendency towards a positive relationship. The
instruments for conflict in the trade model include military expenditures and
the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC). CINC has no signifi-
cant effect on conflict, while military expenditures increase conflict potentials. I
chose rainfall as the instrumental variable to explain trade in the conflict mod-
els. Rainfall is a known predictor for economic variables. Rainfall has a positive
15
effect on trade. To account for possible limitations with my instrumental vari-
ables, I employ a dynamic panel GMM estimator. The GMM estimator has the
advantage to use past outcomes of the endogenous variable as instruments.
I treated missing trade values as real missing. My robustness checks deal
differently with missing trade values in assuming them to be zero. The negative
relationship between trade and conflict is stronger in this setup. Another set
of robustness checks include a development indicator (HDI) and focuses on the
post Cold War period only, the trade conflict relationship looses some of its
significance.
I find a tendency that trade and conflict are negatively related in their re-
spective models. Trade enhances peace, because possible welfare gains of trade
would diminish by interstate conflict.
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B Tables
OLS FE PA-AR(1)
Conflictij -1.063** -1.338*** .145
(.446) (.359) (.181)
GPDi 1.551*** 1.397*** 1.561***
(.014) (.147) (.014)
GDPj 1.636*** 2.532*** 1.627***
(.014) (.141) (.014)
PCIi .223*** -.680*** .249***
(.023) ( .133) (.023)
PCIj .125*** -1.931*** .054**
(.024) ( .131) (.023)
Distij -2.444*** - -2.37***
(.036) ( .037)
Contigij .417* - -.020
(.222) (.244)
Languageij 1.370*** - 1.431***
(.077) (.082)
RTAij -.754*** -.768*** .067
(.142) ( .081) (.087)
Currencyij 1.582*** .398** .933***
(.212) (.201) (.161)
Colonyij 1.848*** - 1.711***
( .179) (.188)
Legalij .182*** - .160**
(.062) (.065)
Coldwarij .058 -.025 -1.338***
(.036) (.037) (.047)
Democi 3.436*** 1.813*** 2.020***
( .088) (.099) (.070)
Democj 2.288*** .719*** 1.469***
( .089) (.097) (.070)
Time fixed effects: yes yes yes
Year trend yes yes no
n 644787 644787 507828
R2 0.48 0.26 n.a.
Table 1: Trade gravity equation - 1948 to 2001
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. I use clustered standard errors.
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OLS FE PA-AR(1)
F1.Conflictij -.246** -.313*** -.215*
(.124) (.117) ( .122)
F2.Conflictij -.173 -.181 -.073
( .125) ( .120) (.113)
F3.Conflictij -.141 -.179 -.210*
(.121) (.118) (.122)
F4.Conflictij .000 -.012 -.055
( .119) (.110) (.120)
F5.Conflictij -.186 -.128 -.240*
( .118) (.109) (.127)
L1.Conflictij -.616*** -.624*** -.523***
(.127) (.135) (.134)
L2.Conflictij -.372*** -.243* -.339**
( .140) ( .135) ( .136)
L3.Conflictij -.280** -.230* -.434***
(.127) (.119) ( .132)
L4.Conflictij -.575*** -.420*** -.466***
(.136) (.131) ( .136)
L5.Conflictij -.268* -.221* -.350**
(.138) (.133) (.141)
GPDi 1.490*** .035 1.528***
(.017) (.202) (.017)
GDPj 1.634*** 2.296*** 1.607***
( .017) (.193) (.017)
PCIi .289*** .881*** .310***
( .031) ( .188) ( .029)
PCIj .222*** -1.731*** .115***
(.032) (.185) (.029)
Distij -2.540*** - -2.481***
(.045) ( .045)
Contigij .827*** - .200
(.267) (.281)
Languageij 1.255*** - 1.317***
( .093) (.097)
RTAij -1.945*** -1.371*** -.759***
( .227) ( .109) (.146)
Currencyij 1.613*** .449* .761***
(.246) (.235) (.185)
Colonyij 2.366*** - 2.521***
(.202) (.207)
Legalij .106 - -.044
(.074) (.078)
Coldwarij - - -
Democi 3.939*** .970*** 2.134***
( .105) ( .107) ( .077)
Democj 2.385*** .281** 1.515***
(.106) ( .112) (.078)
Time fixed effects: yes yes yes
Year trend yes yes no
n 401443 401443 329834
R2 0.47 0.19 n.a.
Table 2: Trade gravity equation - 1948 to 2001 - Lag and Leads of Conflict
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. I use clustered standard errors.
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First Stage OLS-IV OLS-Predicted FE-IV GMM-Bond
GPDi -.0010*** -.158*** .0008
(.00013) (.0251) (.0006)
GDPj -.0010*** -.129*** .0005
(.00013) (.0251) (.0006)
PCIi -.0010*** -.363*** -.003***
(.00008) ( .016) (.0006)
PCIj -.0013*** -.393*** -.002***
(.00008) (.016) (.0006)
Distij -.0035*** -.894*** -
(.00012) (.020)
Contigij .0727*** 1.754*** -
(.0006) (.050)
Languageij .0006*** .454*** -
( .00026) ( .046)
RTAij -.0124*** -1.224*** .0018***
( .00056) (.090) (.0007)
Currencyij -.0032*** .519*** .0044***
(.00078) (.105) (.0012)
Colonyij .0133*** .431*** -
(.00065) (.065)
Legalij -.0010*** -.402*** -
(.0002) (.040)
Coldwarij .0020** n.a. .0161***
(.0008) ( .063) (.0055)
Democi .0010*** .112* -.0036***
(.00035) (.063) ( .0005)
Democj -.0000 .0503 -.0031***
(.00034) ( .063) ( .0005)
Milexi .0022*** .572*** .0019***
(.0001) (.020) (.0001)
Milexj .0025*** .551*** .0020***
(.0001) (.020) (.0001)
Cinci -.000 .008 .0000
(.0001) (.038) (.0002)
Cincj -.000 .007 .0000
(.0001) (.038) (.0002)
F-Stat 254.59 0.32 n.a.
Second Stage
Conflictij 78.101*** .044 3.272 .340**
(3.686) (.028) ( 4.377) (.140)
GPDi 1.417*** 1.496*** 1.597*** 1.546***
(.008) ( .018) ( .0513) ( .014)
GDPj 1.508*** 1.588*** 2.484*** 1.631***
(.009) (.018) (.049) (.014)
PCIi .332*** .237*** -.949*** .231***
( .0107) (.027) ( .048) (.023)
PCIj .238*** .096*** -1.950*** .123***
(.0113) (.027) (.0481) (.023)
Distij -2.046*** -2.123*** - -2.419***
( .0215) (.048) (.036)
Contigij -5.123*** .471** - .258
(.2749) (.220) (.224)
Languageij 1.379*** 1.442*** -.723*** 1.378***
( .0312) (.094) (.054) (.077)
RTAij -.146* -.970*** .438*** -.570***
(.081) (.135) ( .091) ( .129)
Currencyij 1.860*** 1.507*** - 1.461***
(.093) ( .399) (.198)
Colonyij .519*** 1.572*** - 1.869***
( .093) (.195) ( .178)
Legalij .195*** .178*** - .166***
(.024) (.068) (.062)
Coldwarij .008 .449* .423 1.555***
(.096) (.248) (.418) (.225)
Democi 3.599*** 2.865*** 1.938*** 3.248***
( .038) ( .102) (.046) ( .083)
Democj 2.525*** 1.833*** .816*** 2.184***
( .039) (.098) (.046) (.084)
Time fixed effects: yes yes yes yes
Year trend yes yes yes yes
n 570590 378862 570590 644787
R2 0.69 0.26 0.46 n.a.
Table 3: Dealing with Endogeneity - 1948 to 2001 - IV regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. I use clustered standard errors. For the
underlying OLS I get an F-test of F(4,570520)=254.55 for the four instruments, an Anderson χ2
4
=1017.95 and a
Sargent χ2
3
=110.609 with p=0.00. For the GMM model I get a Sargent χ2
104
=883.15 and Hansen χ2
104
=164.64
with p > χ2=0.00.
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Logit FE-Logit PA-AR(1)
Tradeij -.017*** -.028*** -.022***
( .006) (.004) ( .006)
GDPi -.065 -.366** .030
(.075) ( .155) (.055)
GDPj -.075 -.367** .003
(.070) ( .150) (.051)
PCIi -.341 -.175 -.448***
( .043) (.146) ( .034)
PCIj -.463*** -.172 -.688***
( .049) ( .144) ( .034)
Distij -.798*** - -1.042***
(.066) (.046)
Contigij 1.885*** - 1.484***
(.171) (.103)
Languageij .536*** - .376***
( .141) ( .090)
Allianceij -.304* -.276** -.274***
(.159) (.141) ( .099)
Colonyij .747*** - .920***
( .225) (.104)
Legalij -.140 - -.047
(.120) (.079)
Coldwarij .514*** -.300 .439***
( .174) (.085) (.086)
Democi -.154 -.693*** .362***
(.175) ( .159) ( .139)
Democj -.368** -.610*** -.671***
( .184) ( .158) (.134)
Milexi .488*** .473*** .405***
( .059) (.046) (.045)
Milexj .538*** .474*** .559***
(.055) ( .044) ( .041)
Time fixed effects: yes no no
Year trend no no no
n 549377 25090 300723
R2 0.30 0.26 n.a.
Table 4: Conflict gravity equation - 1948 to 2001
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. I use clustered standard errors.
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Logit FE-Logit PA-AR(1)
L1.Tradeij -.033*** -.020** -.024**
(.008) (.008) ( .011)
L2.Tradeij .007 .007 .009
(.008) (.009) (.012)
L3.Tradeij -.001 -.003 -.018
(.009) (.009) ( .012)
L4Tradeij .007 .014 .012
(.008) ( .009) (.012)
L5.Tradeij .000 -.002 -.006
(.008) (.007) ( .012)
GDPi -.115 -1.080** .039
(.091) ( .229) (.060)
GDPj -.144* -.549*** -.050
(.083) ( .193) (.058)
PCIi -.368*** .401** -.443***
(.047) (.201) ( .037)
PCIj -.493*** -.048 -.602***
(.052) ( .179) ( .036)
Distij -.763*** - -1.040***
(.082) (.051)
Contigij 1.939*** - 1.583***
(.196) (.114)
Languageij .386*** - .354***
( .158) ( .099)
Allianceij -.117 -.433*** -.472***
( .171) ( .162) (.109)
Colonyij .783*** - .937***
( .267) (.119)
Legalij -.054 - -.113
(.134) (.087)
Coldwarij -.258* -.410*** .020
(.134) ( .102) (.088)
Democi -.078 -.559*** .008
( .201) ( .161) ( .149)
Democj -.370* -.431*** -.377***
( .209) (.156) (.141)
Milexi .532*** .725*** .414***
( .074) (.052) ( .050)
Milexj .576*** .666*** .592***
( .067) (.046) ( .046)
Time fixed effects: yes no no
Year trend no yes no
n 396560 21012 256945
R2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Table 5: Conflict gravity equation - 1948 to 2001 - Lag of Trade
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. I use clustered standard errors.
25
First Stage IV-Probit IV- LPM IV FE LPM GMM-Bond
GPDi 1.391*** 1.391*** 1.862***
(.012) ( .012) (.054)
GDPj 1.242*** 1.242*** 2.438***
(.012) (.012) ( .053)
PCIi .307*** .307*** -1.128***
(.008) ( .008) (.048)
PCIj .243*** .243*** -1.984***
(.008) (.008) ( .047)
Distij -2.260*** -2.260*** -
( .012) (.012)
Contigij .650*** .650*** -
(.056) ( .056)
Languageij 1.550*** 1.550*** -
(.024) ( .024)
Allianceij -.331*** -.331*** .169***
(.033) (.033) (.064)
Colonyij 1.667*** 1.667*** -
(.060) (.060)
Legalij .037** .037*** -
(.018) (.018)
Coldwarij -1.022*** -.200*** .391
(.068) (.074) (.441)
Democi 3.416*** 3.416*** 1.839***
(.034) (.034) ( .044)
Democj 2.254 2.254*** .797***
(.034) (.034) ( .045)
Milexi .106*** .106*** -.127***
( .010) (.010) (.013)
Milexj .339*** .339*** .106***
(.010) ( .010) (.012)
Raini .151*** .151*** .092**
(.011) (.011) (.041)
Rainj .283*** .283*** -.237***
(.011) ( .011) (.040)
F-Stat 6918.84 6918.84 1220.08
Second Stage
Tradeij .230*** .0039*** .0015 -.00010***
(.039) (.0004) (.0021) (.00003)
GPDi -.371*** -.0066*** -.0013 -.00079**
( .059) ( .0006) ( .0041) (.0003)
GDPj -.348*** -.0063*** -.0034 -.00102***
(.054) ( .0005) (.0053) ( .0003)
PCIi -.201*** -.0022*** -.0018 -.00087***
(.013) ( .00015) (.0025) ( .0002)
PCIj -.215*** -.0022*** .0005 -.0011***
( .011) (.00012) (.0044) ( .0002)
Distij .206** .0051*** - -.00309***
( .090) ( .0009) (.00046)
Contigij .703*** .0669** - .07078***
( .041) ( .00076) ( .0064)
Languageij -.152** -.0050*** - .00129
( .064) (.00074) ( .00098)
Allianceij -.055* -.0040*** -.0035*** -.00253*
( .030) (.00042) ( .0009) ( .00151)
Colonyij -.047*** .0043*** - .0116***
(.076) ( .0010) (.0043)
Legalij -.061*** -.00090*** - -.00092*
(.021) ( .00023) (.00052)
Coldwarij .304*** .0025*** -.018*** -.0172***
(.086) (.00092) ( .006) ( .0039)
Democi -.932*** -.0138*** -.005*** .00052
(.147) ( .0016) (.0040) ( .00081)
Democj -.740*** -.0107*** -.0039*** .00017
( .108) ( .0011) (.0018) ( .00081)
Milexi .192*** .0021*** .0023*** .00209***
( .011) (.00012) ( .0003) (.00025)
Milexj .161*** .0016*** .0018*** .00243***
( .015) ( .00017) (.0002) (.00026)
Time fixed effects: yes yes yes yes
Year trend yes yes yes yes
n 489557 489557 489557 51226
R2 0.69 0.26 0.46 n.a.
Table 6: Dealing with Endogeneity - 1960 to 2000 - IV regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. I use clustered standard errors. For the
IV-Probit I get a Wald χ2
1
=36.82 with p=0.00 for the exogeneity of the instruments. For the IV-LPM model the
F-stat is F(2,???)=402.26, an Anderen χ2
2
=803.98 with p=0.00 and a Sargan χ2
1
=10.035 with p=0.0015. The
GMM model has a Sargan χ2
79
=500.37 with p=0.00 and a Hansan χ2
79
=191.04 with p=0.00.
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Trade models Pooled OLS FE PA-AR(1) IV-2SLS IV-FE GMM-Bond
adding development
Conflictij -1.232*** -.009 -.0701 14.502*** -61.725*** -.147
( .302) (.140) (.101) ( 4.519) (7.842) (.200)
n 327426 327426 294774 311612 311612 327426
R2 0.50 0.32 n.a. 0.48 0.16 n.a.
post Cold war period
Conflictij -1.360*** -.263 -.062 58.159*** 84.673 .653**
(.422) (.180) (.160) (9.498) (163.044) (.272)
n 214222 214222 208184 187022 187022 214222
R2 0.53 0.35 n.a. 0.30 0.00 n.a.
using missing values
Conflictij -3.613*** -1.773*** -.006 -33.57*** -55.377*** -.739***
( .390) (.231) (.079) (2.262) ( 4.182) (.173)
n 953646 953646 864476 793050 793050 953646
R2 0.47 0.33 n.a. 0.41 0.11 n.a.
Conflict models Pooled Logit FE-Logit PA-AR(1) IV-Probit IV-FE-LPM GMM-Bond
adding development
Tradeij -.006 -.000 -.011 -6.386 .001* -.000
( .010) (.009) (.009) (5.074) (.004) ( .00004)
n 297785 9568 203881 260912 260912 297785
R2 0.29 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.00 n.a.
post Cold War period
Tradeij -.029** -.001 .003 .472*** .000 -.0001*
(.013) (.019) (.013) (.079) (.003) (.00005)
n 165798 2024 151428 126303 126303 165799
R2 0.33 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.00 n.a.
using missing values
Tradeij -.027*** -.039*** -.013*** .613*** -.001 -.0001***
( .005) (.003) (.003) ( .100) ( .001) (.00003)
n 773085 34854 425608 666530 666530 720263
R2 0.31 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.00 n.a.
Table 7: Robustness Checks
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. I use clustered standard errors. Note the models
including development cover the years 1970 to 2001 only. The models using rainfall cover the period 1960 to 2000.
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